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NOTE
A QUESTION OF CLASS: DOES 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1985(3)
PROTECT WOMEN WHO ARE BARRED FROM
ABORTION CLINICS
MAR Y F. LEHENY
INTRODUCTION
The ongoing battle between those who champion "freedom of choice"
and those who advocate "right to life" has escalated in recent years as
each side more vehemently, and often more violently, asserts its position
on abortion. At the center of the controversy is the death of a right: to
pro-life protestors, it is the right to life of a potential person; to pro-
choice advocates, it is the destruction of a woman's right to privacy and
her right of choice. The battleground shifts as the combatants switch
techniques to advocate their views. The combatants face ultimate de-
nouement in the courtroom. The first skirmishes, however, take place at
abortion clinics across the United States.
Between 1977 and 1990, abortion clinics reported 129 acts of violence
to the National Abortion Federation ("NAF")-thirty-four clinics were
bombed, fifty-two clinics were set ablaze, and forty-three clinics were
prey to attempted bombings or arson.' Additionally, according to the
NAF, there were "266 clinic invasions, 269 incidents of vandalism, 64
assaults and batteries, 77 death threats, 2 kidnappings, and 22 burgla-
ries."2 From January to March 1991, two more clinics were firebombed
and arson destroyed or damaged another two.' Along with these actively
destructive methods, an increasingly popular technique advocated by
anti-abortion organizations is to block clinic doors physically so that no
one-neither patients nor non-patients--can enter the clinic.4 As a di-
rect result, clinics shut down and women are forced to travel long dis-
tances in order to obtain abortions.
Physical and mental assault characterizes a patient's visit to a block-
1. See Brief for the Nat'l Abortion Fed'n & Planned Parenthood Fed'n, Inc. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, cert granted, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2006 (1991). The National Abortion Federa-
tion ("NAF') compiled these figures for its publications, Incidents of Violence & Disrup-
tion Against Abortion Providers and Antiabortion Violence: Incidents of Arsons Bombings,
and Attempts 1977-1990. See id. at 4 n.5. A not-for-profit professional association, NAF
is primarily comprised of clinics and physicians' offices offering reproductive health serv-
ices including abortion. There are currently 260 members of NAF in 45 states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Canada. In addition to providing "professional
standards, guidelines, training and education to its members," NAF acts "as a clearing-
house for information and advice to abortion-service professionals and the general pub-
lic." Id. at 1-2.
2. See id. at 4.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 5.
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aded clinic. The following scenario is representative of an abortion clinic
protest or "rescue" as it is called by Operation Rescue:5
[S]igns and objects are waved at clients and client escorts in a threaten-
ing manner and used to impede direct passage into the Center. Dem-
onstrators scream and yell at Center clients, escorts, and staff,
sometimes inches away from their faces, as they enter and exit the
Center. Demonstrators press literature on clients and employees who
have indicated they do not wish to talk or receive such literature.
Demonstrators bump, grab, and push persons wishing to enter the
Center in an effort designed to impede passage. Demonstrators chant,
shout, and scream from the sidewalk alongside the Center in a manner
which is calculated to be and is in fact heard inside the Center. 6
In addition, locks have been "sabotaged by the insertion of foreign sub-
stances into the door keyholes, thereby rendering it impossible to open
the doors."7 In yet another technique used by Operation Rescue, protes-
tors move in a "slow motion, heel-to-toe fashion" 8 to slow down the
clearing process and often refuse to give their real names; such conduct is
considered by some courts to rise to the level of state action because it
frustrates or delays effective police action.9 Through the use of these
techniques the protestors often achieve their goal of closing the clinic, if
only for that day. 10
5. Operation Rescue is "a group of organizations and individuals whose purpose...
is to 'organize and coordinate disruptions of abortion and family planning facilities.'"
Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 860 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting fact-finding memo-
randum of the district court).
6. Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates For Life, Inc., 859 F.2d
681, 683 (9th Cir. 1988). In at least one case, demonstrators screamed "murderers" and
"baby killers" in the faces of those who attempted to enter the clinic. Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617, 620 (N.D. Cal.
1991).
7. Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258, 262
(D. Kan. 1991).
8. Id.
9. See id. State involvement, either through direct participation in the conspiracy or
through a lesser involvement, is required when the clinic alleges a violation of the right to
privacy. Although the Women's Health Care Services case held that the delaying of po-
lice action constituted state involvement, not all courts agree with that finding. See infra
notes 40-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various standards of state
involvement.
10. In a case that is now being decided by the Supreme Court, Operation Rescue
wreaked havoc on Washington D.C. area clinics. During one of the biggest of the weekly
demonstrations, occurring on October 29, 1988, the protestors closed the clinic from 7:00
a.m. to 1:30 p.m.:
'Rescuers' did more than trespass on to the clinic's property and physically
block all entrances and exists [sic]. They also defaced clinic signs, damaged
fences and blocked ingress into and egress from the Clinic's parking lot by park-
ing a car in the center of the parking lot entrance and deflating its tires. On this
and other occasions, "rescuers" have strewn nails on the parking lots and public
streets abutting the clinics to prevent the passage of any cars.
National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1489-90 (E.D. Va.
1989) [hereinafter Bray 1], aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) [hereinafter
Bray I1], cert. granted, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1070 [hereinafter Bray II1]. There appear to
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Abortion clinics have responded to this disruption and interference by
bringing suits" alleging a discriminatory conspiracy against women
under 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3),12 also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act
(the "Act").' 3 Courts are divided, however, on whether section 1985(3)
applies to prohibit right-to-life organizations from impeding women's
rights to go to clinics to obtain abortions. Most courts that have ad-
dressed the issue have found a conspiracy under section 1985(3).' A
minority of courts, however, has held that section 1985(3) offers no pro-
tection, reasoning that there is either no cognizable, protectable class or
be two main reasons for pursuing a federal action instead of merely relying on such state
actions as trespass and conversion. The first is to avoid a multiplicity of suits that would
be required to provide nationwide protection for clinics and abortion patients. The sec-
ond is to provide one circuitwide or nationwide standard that courts throughout the cir-
cuit or United States would follow in such cases.
11. Clinics have standing to sue on behalf of their patients according to the Supreme
Court's standard enunciated in Singleton v. Wulff. See Singleton v. Wulf, 428 U.S. 106,
113-18 (1976). The general rule is that standing cannot be claimed to vindicate the con-
stitutional rights of a third party. Courts must look to two factual elements to determine
whether this rule should be applied in a particular case: (1)whether the enjoyment of the
third party's right is "inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pur-
sue," and (2) whether the third party is able to assert the right, whether there is a "genu-
ine obstacle" to such an assertion. Id. at 114-16. Here, the activity of the patients
seeking abortion is inextricably bound up with the rights of the clinics. Further, the
clinic patients face the same type of obstacles in asserting their own claim as did the
women in Singleton. In that case, the Supreme Court held that doctors could bring an
action on behalf of their abortion patients because a patient may be "chilled" from assert-
ing her claims because of the privacy of her decision and because of the imminent moot-
ness of an individual claim. See id. at 117. Clinic patients face the same types of
obstacles. See also New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 697 F. Supp. 1324,
1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Abortion providers have standing to sue on behalf of their pa-
tients as well as themselves.").
12. Section 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies,
for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immuni-
ties under the laws.., whereby another is injured in his person or property or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured may have an action for the recovery of dam-
ages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
Section 1985(3) was passed as H.R. 320 under the title of "Act to Enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment" and is now known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. Today, section 1 is
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) and section 2 is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1988). See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978).
13. The Act was passed in 1871 to stop the persecution and murder of newly-emanci-
pated Blacks in the South. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1871).
14. See Bray I, supra note 10, at 1492; New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v.
Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2206
(1990); Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 712 F.
Supp. 165, 169 (D. Or.), aff'd as modified, 859 F.2d 681, 687 (9th Cir. 1988); Women's
Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258, 264 (D. Kan. 1991);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617, 623 (N.D.
Cal. 1991); Southwestern Medical Clinics of Nevada v. Operation Rescue, 744 F. Supp.
230, 233 (D. Nev. 1989); Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426, 430 (N.D.N.Y. 1989).
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no constitutional violation. 5 Thus, the current disagreement revolves
around two issues: (1) whether women seeking abortions at clinics are
exercising a constitutional right, and, more importantly, (2) whether wo-
men may be considered a class under the Act. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and heard arguments on these issues on October 7,
1991 in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic. 6
Part I of this Note summarizes and explores the issues that confronted
the parties in Bray. Part II explores the constitutional rights to interstate
travel and to privacy that clinic protestors have abrogated. Part III
urges that the Supreme Court protect, within the framework of section
1985(3), women who seek to enter clinics and obtain abortions; such pro-
tection should apply because the patients are members of the class of
women. This Part explores the language and legislative history of section
1985(3) and past Supreme Court interpretations of the Act in order to
examine its reach and possible limitations. Finally, this Note concludes
that such protection is warranted by the Act's language, by congressional
intent, and by Supreme Court interpretations.
I. BRAY v. ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S HEALTH CLINIC: A NEW
FRONTIER FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 1985(3)
A. Background
After extensive protests and organized rescues by Operation Rescue at
abortion clinics in the metropolitan Washington D.C. area, 7 the plain-
tiffs-medical facilities and women's organizations-in Bray v. Alexan-
dria Women's Health Clinic 1 applied for a permanent injunction to
enjoin protestors from trespassing on, impeding or obstructing ingress
into or egress from any facility in the Washington metropolitan area that
offers and provides legal abortion services and related medical and psy-
chological counseling. 9 After oral arguments, the district court held
that there was a section 1985(3) conspiracy against a class, consisting of a
subset of women, which violated the class's right to travel. 20 The court
issued a permanent injunction.
Operation Rescue and the six individual defendants appealed the per-
manent injunction, while the National Organization for Women cross-
appealed the district court's refusal to extend the scope of the injunction.
15. See Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 794 (5th Cir.
1989); Roe v. Abortion Abolition Soc'y, 811 F.2d 931, 936 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 848 (1987); National Abortion Fed'n v. Operation Rescue, 721 F. Supp. 1168, 1171
(C.D. Cal. 1989).
16. Bray 111, supra note 10.
17. Bray was originally brought in the neighboring District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia and proceeded to the Fourth Circuit from which it was granted certi-
orari. See Bray I, supra note 10 at 1483; and Bray II, supra note 10 at 582.
18. Bray III, supra note 10.
19. See Bray I, supra note 10 at 1488.
20. See id. at 1493.
21. See id. at 1486.
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The Fourth Circuit rejected both appeals and affirmed' based on the
district court's finding that the "activities of appellants in furtherance of
their beliefs had crossed the line from persuasion into coercion and oper-
ated to deny the exercise of rights protected by law."'
B. Bray's Primary Issue: Class
Bray presents two issues to the Supreme Court. The Court must deter-
mine whether denying or impinging women's access to abortion clinics
violates a constitutional right. The rights allegedly implicated in the
blocking of an abortion clinic are the fundamental rights to travel inter-
state and the right to obtain an abortion. Then, assuming the Court finds
a constitutional violation, the plaintiffs must establish that women exer-
cising their fundamental rights constitute a class. The question of class is
central to the determination of Bray. Both sides have focused their posi-
tions on this issue and, conceivably, the Supreme Court could resolve
Bray solely on this issue thus short-circuiting a politically charged funda-
mental rights analysis.
The Bray parties address three main questions regarding this issue of
class. First, are women a class within the meaning of section 1985(3)?
Second, is there a valid class under section 1985(3) with the requisite
invidious discriminatory animus? Central to this issue is whether people
conspire against women as a class when they target specifically those wo-
men who elect to exercise their constitutional rights respecting abortion
and related services, with a purpose to suppress the exercise of those
rights by women generally.24 Those rights include the right to travel
interstate to obtain such services. The parties to Bray also disagree as to
whether the class is under-inclusive.2" Third, do the protestor-petition-
ers' activities demonstrate an invidiously discriminatory animus against
women?
Supreme Court section 1985(3) precedent allows the Supreme Court
leeway in which to decide the issues it faces. Legislative intent, as well as
later congressional action, however, direct the Court's resolution. The
Court must look beyond personal beliefs on abortion to protect the free-
dom of all women to exercise their constitutional rights.
II. INITIAL QUESTION: IMPLICATION OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Although the primary issue that has split the circuit and district courts
is whether women who seek health care at abortion clinics can be consid-
ered a class under section 1985(3), this question is moot without a finding
of a constitutional right violation-a prerequisite to receiving protection
under section 1985(3). This two-part analysis is at the core of the test set
22. See Bray I1, supra note 10 at 584.
23. Id. at 585.
24. See Brief for Respondents at 24, Bray III, supra note 10.
25. For a discussion of the under-inclusive argument, see supra notes 128-36.
1992]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
forth by the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge.2 6 While the Court
has not established a precise standard for class standing under section
1985(3), it did preclude a class based on "economic" traits in United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott27 and implied
that women, as a class, are protected by section 1985(3) in Great Ameri-
can Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Novotny.28
A. The Constitutional Right to Travel
Protestors violate clinic patients' constitutional right of interstate
travel when they blockade the entrances to clinics. Historically, the
Supreme Court has considered the right to travel to be constitutionally
guaranteed, 29 even though such a right is not specifically enumerated in
the Constitution. Moreover, the Supreme Court has invoked the right to
travel to protect women seeking an abortion in Doe v. Bolton,3° which
held that "[t]he constitutional right to travel includes the right to travel
interstate to obtain an abortion."'3 1
Of additional importance to women traveling between states to obtain
abortions, the Court held in Griffin v. Breckenridge32 that section
1985(3) applied when the constitutional right to interstate travel was al-
legedly infringed.33 This fundamental right, unlike the right to privacy,
26. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). From the Act, the Supreme Court
created a four-part test that is employed today to determine whether a complaint falls
within the purview of § 1985(3). The complaint must allege that the defendants:
(1)'Conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another' (2)
'for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immuni-
ties under the laws.' It must then assert that one or more of the conspirators (3)
did, or caused to be done, 'any act in furtherance of the object of [the] conspir-
acy,' whereby another was (4a) 'injured in his person or property' or (4b) 'de-
prived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States.'
Id. at 102. This standard is limited in application by the requirement that "there must be
some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind
the conspirators' action." Id.
27. 463 U.S. 825, 827-28 (1983); see infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
28. 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979); see infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. For a
general discussion of the historical background of § 1985(3), see Cogan, Section 1985(3)'s
Restructuring of Equality: An Essay on Texts, History, Progress, and Cynicism, 39
Rutgers L. Rev. 515 (1987); Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: A Mod-
ern Vision of 42 U.S. C. Section 1985(3), 64 Tex. L. Rev. 527 (1985); McDonald, Starting
from Scratch: A Revisionist View of 42 U.S. C. § 1985(3) and Class-Based Animus, 19
Conn. L. Rev. 471 (1987).
29. See New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1360-61 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710
F. Supp. 577, 582 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir.
1990).
30. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
31. Id. at 200.
32. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
33. See id. at 106. Here, the Supreme Court stated that § 1985(3) protects the right
to interstate travel because it is "constitutionally protected, does not necessarily rest on
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is protected from purely private as well as governmental interference. 3
Thus, clinics and patients need not demonstrate state action or involve-
ment.3 5 Further, the typical scenario at an abortion clinic, where a group
of protestors conspires and stops the travel of a group of patients, can be
analogized to the factual setting that led to the Supreme Court's holding
that section 1985(3) protects Black car passengers from White, non-state
involved attackers who violated their right to travel.3 6
The constitutional right to interstate travel supports injunction of
clinic demonstrations because many women travel to clinics located in
other states.37 Protestors' blockades prevent these women from entering
clinics and obtaining abortions. Thus, this interference demonstrates vio-
lation of patients' constitutional right to free travel.3 8
B. Controversy Surrounds the Right to Privacy
Protestors also impinge the patients' right to obtain an abortion. Un-
like the right to travel, which has been accepted as a constitutional
right, 9 the right to privacy, which is based upon a penumbra theory,"
has been under attack since Roe v. Wade"' recognized a woman's right to
abortion. Those courts that have undertaken a privacy analysis have
found that clinics and patients must prove state involvement in the con-
the Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertable against private as well as governmental
interference." Id. at 105. This is important to women seeking abortions who bring an
action under § 1985(3) because they often travel interstate to reach medical facilities that
offer abortion services.
34. See id. at 96-97.
35. See New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1360 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F.
Supp. 577, 581 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990).
36. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1971); infra note 83; Portland
Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates For Life, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 165, 168 (D.
Or.), aff'd as modified, 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988).
37. Women may travel because a clinic has better medical services or because there is
not a clinic offering abortions in the patient's state of residence.
38. The Supreme Court held that women who seek medical services, particularly
abortions, have the constitutional right to travel interstate to obtain such services. See
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973).
39. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 106 (1971); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 757 (1966).
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
41. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Among the Supreme Court decisions addressing the Roe
decision, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) is the most signifi-
cant harbinger of the Court's future direction. A plurality endorsed abandonment of
Roe's trimester scheme allowing states to regulate abortions prior to the point of viability.
Id. at 517-20. The Court also upheld a bar on state employees performing abortions and
a ban on the use of public facilities for abortions. let at 492. See also City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (upheld Ohio statute
that, with certain exceptions, prohibited any person from performing an abortion on an
unmarried, unemancipated minor without prior notice to one of her parents or receiving
a court order of approval); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462
U.S. 476 (1983) (upheld parental consent requirement as long as there is an alternative
procedure for obtaining authorization for an abortion).
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spiracy in order to sustain an action under section 1985(3). These courts
reason that this right exists only against state interference.42
The state involvement required for a privacy action manifests itself in a
variety of circumstances. A clinic may prove state involvement gener-
ally, simply demonstrating that the conspiracy is directed at influencing
the activity of the state.4 3 "In certain circumstances," one court has
written, "private action which inhibits or thwarts the ability of the state
to guarantee equal protection may cause the state either unwillingly or
unwittingly to further the ends of the conspiracy."'  Such state involve-
ment may arise, for example, when protestors fail to inform local police
of their intended protests, thus inhibiting the police from intervening in
the protests.45 In such circumstances, a clinic need not prove that state
actors actually formulated or initiated the conspiracy in order to estab-
lish state involvement under section 1985(3).46
An attempt to change state abortion laws may also constitute state
involvement. For instance, a plaintiff's allegations that a purpose of the
conspiracy was to influence state legislative action may be sufficient to
state a claim under section 1985(3). 4 ' That reasoning, however, has been
dismissed by one court which found that Operation Rescue's attempt to
influence state and federal legislators to change abortion laws was insuffli-
42. See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 227 (6th
Cir. 1991); Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates For Life, Inc., 712
F. Supp. 165, 168 (D. Or.), aff'd as modified, 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988); Roe v. Opera-
tion Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1989). In Griffin v. Breckenridge, the
Supreme Court held that § 1985(3) protects individuals or classes of people from private
conspiracies, thus state involvement is not necessary. See 403 U.S. 88, 96 (1971). This
holds true, however, only where the constitutional right is a fundamental right, i.e., not
merely protected from state interference. Thus, protection of the right to privacy, which
is founded in the fourteenth amendment, under § 1985(3) requires some form of state
involvement.
43. Portland Feminist, 712 F. Supp. at 168; New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v.
Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1260 (S.D.N.Y.), affid as modified, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir.
1989).
44. Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258, 265
(D. Kan. 1991).
45. See id. at 266.
46. See id. at 265. Taking the opposite view, the District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania found that protestors' blockade of access to area clinics and their
failure to notify the police of their next target did not satisfy the state involvement re-
quirement. The court rejected the clinics' claim that these actions rendered police offi-
cials incapable of protecting the abortion clinic clients' rights to equal medical treatment.
Therefore, the court found that the clinics did not meet the requisite showing of state
involvement. See Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp 577, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
47. See Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates For Life, Inc., 712
F. Supp. 165, 168 (D. Or.), aff'd as modified, 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing
Supreme Court decision in United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463
U.S. 825, 830 (1983), which required that a plaintiff bringing a § 1985(3) action that is
enforceable only against the state, such as the right to privacy, must allege and prove that
the state is involved in or affected by the conspiracy).
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cient to meet the state involvement requirement.4
Further support for state involvement lies in protestors' defiance of
arrest. Protestors often force police to arrest, charge, and physically re-
move each individual member of their group; such activity arguably in-
hibits police effectiveness such that the state unwittingly furthers the
conspiracy. Although the protestors may have intended to overwhelm a
given police force's ability to protect clinic patients, the Sixth Circuit has
held that "this fact alone is insufficient to show a nexus between the state
and the defendants, nor does it suggest joint or concerted action between
the defendants and the police."' 9 However, when police protection is
hindered by such techniques, causing clinic patients delay or deprivation
of medical services, there is state involvement.5"
Most courts hold that a finding of state involvement should lead to the
further finding of a constitutional violation, as the protestors' blockades
impede women and often prevent them from exercising their right to an
abortion. The most authoritative exception to the majority view is the
Fifth Circuit; this court not only failed to acknowledge a constitutional
48. See Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 919 F.2d 857, 874 (3d Cir. 1990).
49. Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 227 (6th Cir.
1991).
50. Most courts have agreed that state involvement is required in order to support a
finding of a violation of the right to privacy. The Eighth Circuit, however, in an opinion
that was later vacated without discussion, took a completely different tack in Lewis v.
Pearson Foundation, Inc., 908 F.2d 318 (8th Cir.), vacated 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990).
It found that section 1985(3) does not contain a state action requirement where the claim
rests upon the Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), decision that a wo-
man's right to decide to terminate her pregnancy is part of her right to privacy. See
Lewis, 908 F.2d at 322. The court did find alternatively that there was state involvement
in the plaintiff's allegation that the Missouri Attorney General participated in the con-
spiracy by publicly announcing that the pseudo-clinic's advertising did not constitute
misrepresentation. See id. at 320. This case also differs from others because the protest
organization went beyond merely blockading a clinic. In this case, the organization cre-
ated its own mock clinic in order to deceive pregnant women into thinking they were at
an abortion clinic and with the purpose of dissuading the women from going through
with the procedure. See id. at 319. Perhaps it is because this case is so egregious that the
Eighth Circuit initially took a more lenient view on the applicability of the right to pri-
vacy and allowed § 1985(3) protection without real state involvement. There are no
other cases where a court has applied the right to privacy under § 1985(3) so progres-
sively and this is probably the reason for the Circuit's subsequent vacating of the case. In
reaching its initial decision, the Eighth Circuit relied upon several Supreme Court prece-
dents. See id. at 321-22 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), asserting the right
to privacy as a fundamental right, and United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58
(1966), holding that Congress has the power under the fourteenth amendment to enforce
the rights guaranteed by that amendment against private conspiracies). It pointed to the
existence of personal choice in marriage and family life in the first, fourth, fifth, ninth,
and fourteenth amendments, reasoning that "[b]y their nature, these interests would be
meaningless were they to be protected only from interference by the state." Lewis, 908
F.2d at 322. See generally, Beth E. Hansen, Note, "Invidiously Discriminatory Ani-
mus"--A Class Based on Gender and Gestation Under 42 USC § 1985(3): Lewis v.
Pearson Foundation, Inc., 24 Creighton L. Rev. 1097 (1991) (asserting that § 1985(3)'s
text, legislative intent, Supreme Court and Circuit precedent were ignored in the 8th
Circuit's vacating of its earlier opinion in Lewis).
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violation, but also claimed that the right to an abortion was preserved
because patients were still able to obtain an abortion at the clinic despite
the blockade.5" This assertion runs counter to the traditional protections
afforded fundamental rights. Indeed, if the Fifth Circuit's logic were fol-
lowed, it would be acceptable to blockade or close all houses of worship
in the United States because worshipers could attend services elsewhere
or at a later date. This reasoning is fallacious.
C. How a Conspiracy is Found to Violate a Fundamental Right
Once a fundamental right is found to have been violated, a conspiracy
to impinge such a right must also be identified and proven. Engaging in
a conspiracy to deny women a fundamental right, such as the right to
travel to obtain medical and abortion-related services, is a violation of
section 1985(3).52 Following Supreme Court precedent, clinics and pa-
tients do not need to demonstrate state involvement because the Act is
applicable to private conspiracies, 53 except in cases where the Constitu-
tion protects the fundamental right from only state intervention. None-
theless, there are two limitations to such broad applicability. First,
clinics must demonstrate "'some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' ac-
tion' " because section 1985(3) must not be construed as a "general fed-
eral tort law."54 Secondly, section 1985(3) does not apply to all classes of
persons; although the Supreme Court has left open the boundaries of the
Act's reach, acknowledging that legislative history suggests a broad view,
the Court has disallowed its use for animus based generally upon the
class's economic views or commercial interests. 5
III. THE QUESTION OF CLASS
The question remains, then, whether section 1985(3) can be used to
protect individuals or classes of people other than Blacks from types of
invidiously discriminatory animus other than that which is racially moti-
vated. The majority of the courts that have adjudicated abortion clinic
protest cases have allowed the use of the Act to protect women as a class
51. See id at 794.
52. See New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1346 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct 2206 (1990); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Holy
Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp 617, 624 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Roe v. Operation Res-
cue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 581 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir.
1990); Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates For Life, Inc., 712 F.
Supp. 165, 169 (D. Or.), aff'd as modified, 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988).
53. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96 (1971).
54. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1358 (2d Cir.
1989) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
55. See United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 838
(1983).
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on the basis of a gender-based discriminatory animus.5 6 This Note, as
well, takes the position that section 1985(3) should protect women as a
gender-based class. Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule explic-
itly that a gender-based conspiracy can be remedied under section
1985(3), an analysis of the legislative history of section 1985(3), of Con-
gress's action in protecting pregnant women in Title VII,", of the text of
section 1985(3), and of the Supreme Court's interpretation of section
1985(3) leads to the unmistakable conclusion that women are a protected
class under section 1985(3).
A. Legislative History of 42 US. C. Section 1985(3)
Examination of congressional history and legislative intent strongly
suggests that Congress intended the Act's reach to extend protection be-
yond Blacks to other classes of people including women. Representative
Shellabarger introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the "Civil Rights
Act") on March 28, 1871, to "enforce the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other pur-
poses.""8 The second section of the Civil Rights Act, also known as the
Ku Klux Klan Act, was the precursor to today's section 1985(3). The
Act had as its central purpose the protection of newly emancipated
Blacks from Ku Klux Klan activities in the post-Civil War South."9 The
breadth of the Act, however, was subject to debate; although the Act was
introduced as a corollary to the fourteenth amendment, Congress in-
tended to go beyond the state action requirements of that amendment to
56. Terry, at 1358-59; Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for
Life, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D. Or.), aff'd, 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988); Women's
Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258, 265 (D. Kan. 1991);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617, 623 (N.D.
Cal. 1991); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 581 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990); Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426, 430
(N.D.N.Y. 1989). The Third Circuit held that "sex discrimination [falls] within the cate-
gories of animus condemned by 1985(3)." Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1243-44 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366
(1979). The Second Circuit has refuted the argument that animus means "ill-will" stat-
ing that animus "merely describes a person's basic attitude or intention, and because
[protestors'] conspiracy is focused entirely on women seeking abortions, their activities
reveal an attitude or animus based on gender." Terry, 886 F.2d at 1359.
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
58. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978) (quoting Repre-
sentative Shellabarger's speech to Congress as recorded in the Congressional Globe, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 522 (1871)). There were four sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and
section 2 was the basis for § 1985(3). See id. at 665 n.ll; Novotny, 442 U.S. at 370.
59. Originally, the section was introduced as a criminal provision outlawing certain
conspiratorial acts done with intent "to do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or
immunities of another person." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. App. 68 (1871). See
also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99-100 (1971) (discussing the section's legisla-
tive history). Because of the "enormous sweep of the original language," an amendment
creating the present-day civil remedy was added that same year. Id. at 100. The criminal
section was later found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. See United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 642-44 (1882).
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include private conspiracies.' The Act's draftsman's explanation of the
amendment as reaching "any violation" of a right, for example, supports
a broad reach of enforcement.61
Other evidence exists that Congress intended the Act to protect the
rights of all citizens, not limiting its protection to Blacks who were being
persecuted by the Klan. Members of the House, where the original Civil
Rights Act of 1871 was introduced, indicated in their discussion of the
bill that the reach of their legislation went beyond racially based conspir-
acies to include all races, and all citizens62 including women. 63 The in-
tention to include women under the Act's protection, at a time when
60. "I do not want to see [this measure] so amended that there shall be taken out of it
the frank assertion of the power of the national Government to protect life, liberty, and
pr9perty, irrespective of the act of the State." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App.
141 (1871) (statement of Representative Shanks).
61. The object of the amendment is... to confine the authority of this law to the
prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality of rights of American
citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus and effect of which is to
strike down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as
contrasted with his and other citizens' rights, shall be within the scope of the
remedies of this section.
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 478 (1871) (statement of Representative Shellabarger).
62. According to Representative Perce, Congress intended to protect the rights of
"citizens throughout the entire country, without regard to the condition, race, or party
affiliation of the individual citizen." Id. at 512. Protection was provided to "all classes in
all States; to persons of every complexion and of whatever politics." Id. at 376 (statement
of Representative Lowe). Representative Wilson said that Congress would secure to all
persons the equal protection of the laws. Id. at 482. He later added that "there is not of
all the thirty-eight millions [sic] of the citizens of this nation one so humble that his rights
under the Constitution and [the] laws can be [ignored]." Id. at 484. Further, numerous
Representatives also pronounced the intent to protect specific groups and persons, in
addition to Blacks and their "champions." See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
486 (1871) (Representative Cook)(citizens of other states); id. at 339 (Representative Kel-
ley)(same); id. at 517 (Representative Shellabarger)(Republicans); id. at 570 (Senator
Ames)(same); id. at 567 (Sen. Edmunds)(a Democrat, a Catholic, a Methodist, a
Vermonter); id. at 335 (Representative Hoar)(Indian tribes). The opponents to the Act
generally did not discuss what classes might be covered by the section. The main focus of
their discussion was the perceived penalization of the southern states by northern Repub-
licans. See generally Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at app. (1871) (discussing the
roles of Republicans in the post-Civil War South); Brief for Petitioners Bray III, supra
note 10 (brief does not address the Congress members' remarks, suggesting that there was
no congressional intent that these groups not be covered). See also Kaczorowski, Revolu-
tionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 863, 897-98 (1986) (discussion of framers' intent in the related Civil Rights Act of
1866 to protect and enforce the rights of White, as well as Black, citizens). See generally
R. Kaczorowski, The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal Courts, Depart-
ment of Justice and Civil Rights 1866-1876 (1985) (analyzing the effect of federal, judicial
interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments on civil rights legislation, and how
these interpretations further affected the legal theory of national authority over citizens
and citizens' rights).
63. Representative Buckley said "[t]he proposed legislation . . . is not to protect
Republicans only in their property, liberties, and lives, but Democrats as well, not the
colored only, but the Whites also; yes, even women." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.,
at app. 190 (1871) (emphasis added).
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women were not even considered citizens,' 4 indicates the broad reach
that the framers intended to give the Act. In addition, the Civil Rights
Act, and thus section 1985(3) as well, was particularly tied to the Equal
Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Clause, while writ-
ten principally to ensure equality of treatment for the newly freed slaves,
has long since been held to protect women.65
B. The Statutory Language
On its face, the language of section 1985(3) is broad and unconfining.
When interpreted literally, the Act is not limited to Blacks and their
champions, although it was clearly written with them in mind.66
Accordingly, women are not excluded as a possible class.' Mentioned
instead are "persons" and "class[es] of person[s]," rather than more spe-
cific categories of people. 68 The protection of section 1985(3) extends to
"any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States," and although
the Act was principally written to protect Black citizens and those who
championed them, the Act's congressional supporters emphasized the
idea of preventing "'deprivations which shall attack the equality of
rights of American citizens.' ,,69 In addition, one court has asserted that
"[b]y its very language section 1985(3) is necessarily tied to evolving no-
tions of equality and citizenship."70
A literal reading of the statute is logical considering the Supreme
Court's treatment of other civil rights legislation. For instance, in con-
struing the criminal analogue to section 1985(3), the Supreme Court
stated that it "must accord it a sweep as broad as its language."7 ' Signifi-
cantly, section 1983, also enacted in 1871 as part of the Civil Rights Act,
and containing the same language, has been interpreted as protecting a
broad range of persons in addition to Blacks. 72 Thus, a literal interpreta-
tion that offers class status to the female gender would be in keeping with
traditional tenets of civil rights statutory construction.
Further support for including women within the ambit of the Act can
be found in many circuit court decisions that have given section 1985(3)
64. Women were not given full citizenship until the passage of the nineteenth amend-
ment on June 5, 1919. See U.S. Const. amend. XIX.
65. See, eg., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (Court applied an interme-
diate level of scrutiny for gender-based classifications); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 688 (1973) (Court held that classifications based on gender are suspect).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988); see also Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871)
(much of the discussion centered around the persecutory activities of the Ku Klux Klan
against newly-emancipated Blacks).
67. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1358 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1358-59 (emphasis added) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,
100 (1971).
70. See id. at 1359.
71. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966).
72. See Brief for Respondent at 17, Bray III, supra note 10.
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a broader reach than simply limiting it to Blacks. Among the groups
that have been protected are women as a class and classes based on polit-
ical associations or on ethnicity. 3
C. The Supreme Court's Interpretations of Section 1985(3)
The Supreme Court's decisions indicate that it recognizes gender dis-
crimination as protected by section 1985(3). The Court first addressed
section 1985(3) in the context of a civil case in Collins v. Hardyman 4
nearly 70 years after the Act was passed.75 In its initial interpretation,
the Supreme Court limited the breadth of section 1985(3) to conspiracies
that involved the state as a conspirator.76 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court made clear that it was avoiding constitutional questions in order to
avert potential federalism problems.77 Because Collins hinged on the is-
73. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); see, e.g., Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d
1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988) ("§ 1985(3) extends.., to conspiracies to discriminate against
persons based on sex, religion, ethnicity or political loyalty"); Conklin v. Lovely, 834
F.2d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 1987) (political views); McLean v. International Harvester Co.,
817 F.2d 1214, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1987) (section protects classes characterized by "some
inherited or immutable characteristic" or by "political beliefs or associations" (citing
Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 623 F.2d 1060, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980))); Hobson v. Wilson,
737 F.2d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (political affiliations with racial overtones), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1084 (1985); Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 386-88 (2d Cir. 1983) (political
affiliation); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979) (wo-
men purchasers of disability insurance); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n.,
584 F.2d 1235, 1241-43 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc) (women), vacated on other grounds, 442
U.S. 366 (1979); Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978) (sex and ethnicity).
74. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
75. See id. at 651. Plaintiff political club members met to adopt a resolution opposing
the Marshall Plan and to send copies of the resolution to appropriate federal officials.
The political club members alleged that the defendants, apparently members of the
American Legion, conspired to deprive the club members of their rights as citizens of the
United States to peaceably assemble and to enjoy equal privileges and immunities under
the laws of the United States. In furtherance of this conspiracy, the American Legion
members proceeded to the meeting site and, by threats and violence, broke up the meet-
ing, thus interfering with the fundamental right of the club members to petition the gov-
ernment for the redress of grievances. The American Legion members did not interfere
or conspire to interfere with the meetings of other political groups with whose opinions
they agreed. See id. at 652-54.
76. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld dismissal stating
that "[s]uch private discrimination is not inequality before the law unless there is some
manipulation of the law or its agencies to give sanction or sanctuary for doing so." Id. at
661. This was overruled by the Court twenty years later. See Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1971). Involvement by the state in the conspiracy has been defined
differently by different courts. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text. Here, the
Supreme Court interpreted § 1985(3) as requiring active involvement by the state in the
conspiracy, for example by passing discriminatory laws.
77. It is apparent that, if this complaint meets the requirements of this Act, it
raises constitutional problems of the first magnitude that, in the light of history,
are not without difficulty. These would include issues as to congressional power
under and apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, the reserved power of the
States, the content of rights derived from national as distinguished from state
citizenship, and the right of separability of the Act in its application to those
two classes of rights.
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sue of state involvement, the Collins Court did not reach the question of
whether the plaintiffs constituted a class under the statute.78
Justice Burton, dissenting in Collins, took a more literal view, arguing
that state action was not required to sustain a section 1985(3) cause of
action. Relying on the statute's language,79 he asserted that Congress
had created a federal cause of action for a private act abridging federally
created constitutional rights, 0 and argued that while section one of the
Civil Rights Act contained language requiring state action, section two
did not contain such language. This dissimilarity, argued Justice Burton,
indicated that Congress did not intend a state action requirement in that
portion of the Civil Rights Act.81
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court overruled Collins and adopted
Justice Burton's more literal view in Griffin v. Breckenridge.2 The feder-
alism problems that the Court had earlier predicted had not in fact mate-
rialized.8 3 The Court looked to the plain meaning of the statute's
language and held that it provided protection from private conspira-
cies." Other Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes in the previous
twenty years had been given "a sweep as broad as [their] language," and
accordingly the Court gave section 1985(3) the same treatment.8 It did
add a cautionary note, however. Even though the statute reached private
action, "it was [not] intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial inter-
ferences with the rights of others." Instead, the Court counseled, "[t]he
Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 659 (1951). The Court found in Griffn that these
federalism concerns had not materialized. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 95-96. In its next
major section 1985(3) decision, the Court found that such separation of powers problems
no longer existed. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 94; infra notes 83, 84.
78. See Collins, 341 U.S. at 652-53.
79. "The language of the statute refutes the suggestion that action under color of state
law is a necessary ingredient of the cause of action which it recognizes." Id. at 663.
80. See id. at 664.
81. See id. at 663-64.
82. 403 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1971). Plaintiffs were Black passengers in a car driven in
DeKalb, Mississippi, when defendants, who were White, mistakenly believing that the
driver was a Civil Rights for Negroes worker, blocked the passageway of the car, stopped
and detained the car passengers, then beat and injured them. See id. at 90-91. The
Supreme Court overruled Collins to allow § 1985(3) protection to victims of private con-
spiracies. See id. at 96.
83. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, stated that:
It is clear, in the light of the evolution of decisional law in the years that have
passed since [Collins] was decided, that many of the constitutional problems
there perceived simply do not exist. Little reason remains, therefore, not to
accord to the words of the statute their apparent meaning.
Id. at 95-96.
84. See id. at 96.
85. Id. at 97; see, ag., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968) (42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1988)); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966) (same); United
States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 76 (1951) (plurality opinion) (concluding that the pur-
pose of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988), the closest remaining criminal counterpart to § 1985(3),
was to reach private action); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639-44 (1883) (con-
struing criminal counterpart to § 1985(3) to include protection from invasion by private
persons, but also holding that the section was unconstitutional).
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constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting section
1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect
to the congressional purpose., 8 6
Thus the Court left unresolved the question "whether a conspiracy
motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias
would be actionable under the portion of section 1985(3) before us."87
Yet the Griffin decision suggests an affirmative response to this question
because the Griffin Court held that section 1985(3) protected not only the
Black victims of racial attacks, but also supporters of Blacks, such as
civil rights workers, because they too are victims of the conspirators' in-
vidious animus.8
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court in Great American Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Association v. Novotny 89 held that rights created by Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 196490 could not be asserted through the reme-
dial framework of section 1985(3).9' If victims could rely on Title VII as
the basis for a section 1985(3) action, they would, in effect, bypass the
congressionally created administrative and judicial processes, thus
wholly undermining Title VII.92
A vital aspect of the Novotny decision is that the Supreme Court as-
sumed, without so stating, that a conspiracy to discriminate in employ-
ment on the basis of sex came within the scope of section 1985(3). 91
Although not addressed by the other courts, this inference has merit,
especially when Justice Stewart's closing remarks of the majority's opin-
ion are examined:
It is true that a § 1985(3) remedy would not be coextensive with Title
VII, since a plaintiff in an action under § 1985(3) must prove both a
conspiracy and a group animus that Title VII does not require. While
this incomplete congruity would limit the damage that would be done
to Title VII, it would not eliminate it.94
86. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
87. Id. at 102 n.9 (citation omitted).
88. See id. at 103. "Invidious" is defined as "offensively or unfairly discriminating;
harmful; injurious." Random House College Dictionary (rev. ed.) (1988).
89. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
91. See Novotny, 442 U.S. at 377. A savings and loan association intentionally and
deliberately pursued a course of conduct that denied female employees equal employment
opportunities. When respondent, an officer, director, and loan officer of the savings and
loan, expressed support for the female employees at a board of directors meeting, he was
immediately terminated. The loan officer alleged that his support for female employees
was the cause of the termination. He filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and received a right-to-sue
letter authorizing suit against the savings and loan and its directors claiming damages
under § 1985(3). See id. at 368-89.
92. See id. at 375-76, 378.
93. "All of [the Court's] analysis of the relationship of section 1985(3) and Title VII
was unnecessary unless there was a section 1985(3) 'class' of women to begin with." Brief
for Respondents at 21, Bray III, supra note 10.
94. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979).
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A "group animus" does not have to be proven within a Title VII case
because the statute is administered to stop discrimination based on "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin" 9 5 -the same classes within which
a plaintiff in a section 1985(3) case must prove membership. Because the
Court addressed the possibility of whether sex discrimination could be
remedied by section 1985(3), and found only that the administrative re-
quirements imposed by Congress prohibit its application, apparently the
Court believed that gender was a class protected by section 1985(3). Ad-
ditional evidence of the Court's position is Justice White's statement, in
dissent, that "[i]t is clear that sex discrimination may be sufficiently in-
vidious to come within the prohibition of section 1985(3). "96 Thus,
Novotny suggests that section 1985(3) reaches beyond racially motivated
conspiracies.
In its most recent section 1985(3) decision, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 610 v. Scott,97 the Supreme
Court limited the statute's reach. It held that a class based upon "eco-
nomic" traits was not the type of class protected by section 1985(3). 9s
The Court also held that section 1985(3) could not protect victims of a
private conspiracy infringing upon a constitutional right that is by defini-
tion a right only against state interference.99 Therefore, concluded the
Scott Court, "an alleged conspiracy to infringe First Amendment rights
is not a violation of section 1985(3) unless it is proved that the State is
involved in the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy is to influ-
ence the activity of the State."' 0 0
Again, left unanswered by Scott was the question of whether section
1985(3) was intended to reach beyond class-based animus held against
Blacks.1 0 The Court acknowledged Senator Edmunds's 1871 statement
that section 1985(3) would reach any conspiracy, even against a
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
96. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 389 n.6.
97. 463 U.S. 825 (1983). A construction company hired non-union workers for a
project, and a citizen protest against the company's hiring practice was organized. Dur-
ing the protest, company employees were assaulted and beaten and construction equip-
ment was burned and destroyed. The construction company asserted that the union
members had conspired to deprive the non-union members of their legally protected
rights under § 1985(3). See id at 827-28.
98. The Court found that there was no history of a legislative intent for the provision
to "reach conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of their economic
views, status, or activities." Id. at 837.
99. See id. at 833.
100. Id. at 830.
101. The lower court held that § 1985(3) prohibits class-based animus other than race-
based animus, therefore, the non-union laborers and employers were protected as a class
under the Act. See Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224, 230 (F.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd in part.
rev'd in part, 640 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. United Bhd. of Carpenters &
Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983). The court of appeals affirmed holding
that the purpose of the conspiracy was to deprive the non-union workers of their first
amendment right not to associate with a union. See Moore, 640 F.2d at 731. The Fifth
Circuit also held that § 1985(3) reached conspiracies motivated by either political or eco-
nomic bias. See id. at 719.
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"Vermonter," as an indication that the Congress of 1871 may have in-
tended to give the Act a broader sweep than protecting only Blacks.102
The Court refrained from definitively resolving this ambiguity, however.
It argued, instead, that although "Senator Edmunds's views, because he
managed the bill on the floor of the Senate, are not without weight," the
fact that the Act was introduced in the House was of greater impor-
tance. 103 Additionally, the Court noted that in its prior section 1985(3)
cases, it had been aware of the Senator's remarks and had refrained from
rendering judgment on the reach of the Act. Accordingly, the Court
refrained in Scott, as well."° This rationale is flawed, however, because
the Court failed to investigate statements made by the many Members of
the House who supported a broad reach.105
In sum, while section 1985(3) is now available as protection from pri-
vate conspiracies, it can neither be invoked to supersede a congressio-
nally created remedial scheme, nor can it be applied to economically
based groups. The limits of its reach, however, have not been definitively
drawn by the Court, thus leaving latitude for lower courts in their inter-
pretations of the Act.
Although the Supreme Court has specifically left unanswered the ques-
tion of whether section 1985(3) reaches beyond racial bias, 10 6 the Court
has also had other concerns, such as disrupting existing congressionally
mandated remedial schemes,107 when reaching its decisions. These con-
cerns do not exist in the context of abortion clinic protests. In these
situations, according to clinics, "petitioners' conspiratorial campaigns of
intimidation are not regulated by a more specifically tailored federal rem-
edy, and they are precisely the sort of private deprivation of rights at
which Congress was aiming in adopting section 1985(3). " 108
This examination of text, history, and precedent demonstrates the
wide scope of protection that section 1985(3) offers. Now, more than a
century after this broad-minded statute was passed, the Court should
preserve the statute's meaning and openly declare that women are a class
to be protected under section 1985(3). Furthermore, this protection
should follow congressional intent and protect pregnant women who
choose to exercise their right to obtain an abortion as a member of the
class of women.
102. See Scott, 463 U.S. at 836-37.
103. Id. at 837.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 837-39; supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text discussing House
Members' statements that § 1985(3) would reach such disparate groups as women, Indi-
ans, Republicans, and Vermont citizens.
106. See United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983); Grif-
fin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
107. See Scott, 463 U.S. at 836; Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442
U.S. 366, 372-78 (1979).
108. Brief for Respondents at 22 n.38, Bray III, supra note 10.
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D. Women Are Protected as a Class
The class of women who are seeking abortions is well-tailored and
analogous to other classes that have been afforded protection under the
Act."° A class can be as broadly designed as to reach women purchasers
of disability insurance' 0a class that has been found to be "analytically
indistinguishable from a class of women" seeking to exercise their consti-
tutional right to an abortion."' Additionally, section 1985(3) protection
has been extended to other groups besides Blacks and their champions,
so there is no principled reason for denying women who seek health care
at abortion clinics class status under section 1985(3).112
Admittedly, there are limitations on how a class can be defined. The
members of the class cannot be members simply because they are victims
of the same conspiracy. 3 Nor can definition of the class be based upon
characteristics of the conspirators." 4 Nevertheless, the circumstances of
abortion clinic blockade suits rise above these restrictions because the
female class is self-defining.
Protestors have attempted to circumvent women's legitimate status as
a class under section 1985(3) by distinguishing "women who seek abor-
tions" as a subset of the class of women. This attempt at eliminating the
patients' class status, however, has proved ineffective for most courts"5
and has been discredited as a "strained distinction [that is] wholly
109. See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 224 (6th
Cir. 1991).
110. See Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979).
111. Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 712 F.
Supp. 165, 169 (D. Or.), aff'd as modified, 859 F.2d. 681 (9th Cir. 1988).
112. See, eg., Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988) (§ 1985(3) "extends
... to conspiracies to discriminate against persons based on sex, religion, ethnicity or
political loyalty" (citation omitted)); Conldin v. Lovely, 834 F.2d 543, 549-50 (6th Cir.
1987) (holding that § 1985(3) extends to animus directed against political views); Mc-
Lean v. International Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1987) (section
protects classes characterized by "some inherited or immutable characteristic" or by
"political beliefs or associations"); Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978)
(woman had properly pleaded jurisdiction under the statute by alleging discrimination on
the basis of her sex as well as race); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 839 (8th Cir. 1975)
(section protects the right to vote in Indian tribal elections against interference with pri-
vate conspiracies), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227,
1232-35 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (extended to members of a predominantly White reli-
gious group whose services were disrupted by Blacks demanding that the parish alter its
investment policies).
113. See Lucero v. Operation Rescue of Birmingham, No. 91-7685, 1992 WL 19204, at
*4 (11th Cir. Feb. 5, 1992); Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d
788, 793-94 (5th Cir. 1989); Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates For
Life, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D. Or.) (citing Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d
924 (9th Cir. 1975)), aff'd as modified, 859 F.2d 681, 687 (9th Cir. 1988). It should be
noted that until 1981, the Southern States within the 11th Circuit's jurisdiction were part
of the 5th Circuit; thus, it is predictable that decisions like Lucero and Mississippi Wo-
men's would be closely similar. It is also ironic to note that the Act was passed to protect
citizens suffering Ku Klux Klan attacks in these same states.
114. See Portland Feminist, 712 F. Supp. at 169.
115. See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 224-25
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unpersuasive." 116
The ability to be pregnant is a defining characteristic of womanhood,
and the choice of whether to remain pregnant is common to all women.
Thus, a conspiracy against women who choose to terminate pregnancy
does not create a class separate from that of women. The Supreme Court
has supported this rationale." 7 It found that a classification or policy
that burdens some but not all women is gender-based even though many
women are unaffected." 8 Furthermore, it is not
necessary that the conspirators' animus be directed at every individual
member of the class. This kind of reasoning would have permitted
defendants in Griffin v. Breckenridge to eschew the racial animus be-
hind their conspiracy by praising blacks who knew their place and ex-
pressly limiting their acts to those blacks seeking to enjoy the full
autonomy guaranteed them by the Constitution. 11
Just as Congress established in amendments to Title VII that discrimi-
nation on the basis of pregnancy is the same as discrimination on the
basis of gender, the Supreme Court should find that a conspiracy against
pregnant women, who elect to terminate the pregnancy, is the same as
conspiracy against women. In the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978,12° Congress stated that for purposes of Title VII, discrimination
"because of or on the basis of pregnancy" is discrimination "on the basis
of sex."'' A recent Supreme Court case supported gender discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy discrimination and, importantly, went
even further to find gender discrimination independent of Title VII. 22
(6th Cir. 1991); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359-60
(2d Cir. 1989).
116. Volunteer Medical Clinic, 948 F.2d at 224-25. The court explained that:
The fact that only women who "choose" to become pregnant (no doubt a dubi-
ous characterization in many cases) may actively exercise the right to an abor-
tion free from governmental interference in no way entails that the class is
undeserving of § 1985(3) protection. A statute that disenfranchised African
Americans would be no less a deprivation of equal protection of the laws simply
because it was intended to affect only that class of African Americans who wish
to vote. Virtually any conduct that violates equal protection under § 1985(3)
can be characterized as impacting only those members of the class seeking to
exercise the predicate statutory or constitutional right. The Supreme Court has
clearly held, however, that the defendant's conduct need not affect every mem-
ber of the class to make out a § 1985(3) violation.
Id. at 224-25.
117. See International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1196,
1203 (1991).
118. See id.; Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per cuiam).
119. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Respon-
dents at 23, Bray III, supra note 10 (citation omitted).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
121. Id.
122. See International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1196,
1202-03 (1991); see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 684 (1983) (Pregnancy Discrimination Act clearly makes discrimination based on
pregnancy equivalent to sex discrimination for Title VII cases).
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This precedent, although dealing with gender discrimination in the work-
place, can readily be applied to the gender discrimination that takes place
in clinic protests. In both cases, the gender discrimination was based on
pregnancy.
In addition, neither the Constitution nor section 1985(3) contain a re-
quirement that a majority of women be affected before a governmental
practice or private conduct may be analyzed as gender-based. The choice
to have an abortion or to continue the pregnancy to term is still a consti-
tutionally protected right of women as a class."23 Purposefully pursuing
the denial of this right to all women, and the right to travel to effectuate
it, is to conspire against women as a class.
The judicial system as a whole treats women as a semi-suspect class,
and gender-discrimination laws are given heightened scrutiny.' 24 As the
Sixth Circuit has stated:
Gender is precisely the type of "immutable characteristic" that has
consistently been held an improper basis upon which to differentiate
individuals in the allocation of rights. Sex discrimination, whether
overt or invidious, offends the fundamental notion that our nation's
legal protections extend equally to all citizens and is repugnant to the
values of civil rights and liberties upon which our Constitution
rests. 
125
Thus, courts should enjoin any conspiracy that discriminates against wo-
men for a choice they can make because they are women.
Additionally, it is irrelevant that a class of women seeking abortions is
a subset of the class of women because "[a]side from the fact that only
women get pregnant, Congress has legislated in Title VII to protect preg-
nant women from discrimination."' 26 Pregnancy is an immutable charac-
teristic of womanhood. Thus, discrimination against pregnancy or
pregnant women is gender discrimination.
Protestors argue further that the class is under-inclusive because pa-
tients are not the only ones whose entrance to the clinics is barred. They
also assert that because their actions are not directed at women in general
but against an activity, or only a "subgroup" of women, there can be no
class and thus no class-based animus.'27 The Second Circuit has labeled
123. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 772 (1986).
124. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (Court applied an interme-
diate level of scrutiny for gender-based classifications); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 688 (1973) (Court held that classifications based on gender are suspect); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617, 623 (N.D. Cal.
1991) (women seeking an abortion given "semi-suspect class status;" it does not matter
that women seeking abortion is a subset of women as a class).
125. Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 224 (6th Cir.
1991).
126. Holy Angels, 765 F. Supp. at 623; see Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983).
127. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1139, 1360 (2d Cir.
1989), cerL denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
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this argument mere "sophistry ... because [the protestors'] actions are
directed only against those members of a class who choose to exercise
particular rights, ... not against class members whose actions do not
offend them."12 The protestors' under-inclusive argument is also irrele-
vant. The Supreme Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge 29 held that the car
driver, a person who was conspired against-not for being Black but
rather because the conspirators thought he was a civil rights worker-
was protected under the section.' 30 The doctors, nurses, and friends that
have been barred from abortion clinics can likewise be protected by lik-
ening them to the "champions" of Blacks in Griffin.13 '
There is a gender-based conspiracy regardless of whether protestors
block everyone who tries to enter a clinic or whether they simply stop the
patients. Operation Rescue has argued otherwise, alleging that discrimi-
nation cannot be gender-based because it separates persons of the same
gender from one another-obviously, on a basis other than gender. 132
This argument is, in the words of the District Court of Kansas, "facile
and irrelevant," because the group's goal was to eliminate the right to
obtain an abortion, something only a woman can exercise. a33  The
Supreme Court in Novotny found that Title VII protection against gender
discrimination could be extended to protect a male champion of women
workers.134 Such an extension is yet another reason to reject the protes-
tors' argument that their actions are not gender-based because they bar
men as well as women. Also, the fact that the conspiracy has an impact
on some men does not negate the application of section 1985(3). 13
Of great significance is the different effect that the conspiracy has on
those people whose entrance is impeded. While men may be barred, it is
only women who are at risk for the serious health consequences that can
result from a delayed or prevented abortion. According to the Supreme
Court, where women suffer a "substantial burden that men need not suf-
fer," the challenged conduct is gender-based. 136 That standard certainly
applies here where only women can suffer this burden associated with
pregnancy.
Also immaterial is the fact that women are involved in the protests
against patients. It is clearly conceivable that women could conspire
against other women. A nearly analogous situation was recently consid-
128. Id.
129. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
130. See id. at 103.
131. See id.
132. See Brief for Petitioners at 18-19, Bray III, supra note 10 (quoting National Abor-
tion Fed'n v. Operation Rescue, 721 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 1989)).
133. Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258, 264
(D. Kan. 1991).
134. See Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979).
135. See, e.g., id. at 378 (man affected by gender-discrimination against women em-
ployees); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 103 (1971) (holding that someone who was
helping Blacks, such as a civil rights worker, could be protected by § 1985(3)).
136. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977).
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ered involving the issue of whether a dark-skinned Black could discrimi-
nate against a light-skinned Black.'3  Because Congress has
differentiated between "race" and "color" in such protective statutes as
section 1981138 and Title VII, and because the Supreme Court in Saint
Francis College v. Al-Khazraji 39 found that the legislative history of sec-
tion 1981 indicated that it protects all types of ethnic groups within the
caucasian race, "[i]t would take an ethnocentric and naive world view to
suggest that we can divide caucasians into many sub-groups but some-
how all blacks are part of the same sub-group."' 4
Discussing the implications of racial discrimination under section
1981, the Supreme Court concluded that:
Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of
persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because
of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such discrimination is ra-
cial discrimination that Congress intended section 1981 to forbid,
whether or not it would be classified as racial in terms of modem scien-
tific theory.14
Findings that one member of a race can discriminate against another
member of a race on the basis of "physiognomical" distinctions'42 are
analogous to gender discrimination and thus are applicable to section
1985(3) actions.
CONCLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD AFFIRMATIVELY
GUARANTEE WOMEN'S RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 1985(3)
The Supreme Court should answer the question of class affrmatively
by establishing that women are a protected class under the aegis of sec-
tion 1985(3), that women who seek entry to abortion clinics are members
of that class, and that the class's fundamental rights of travel and privacy
have been violated by protestors at abortion clinics.
137. Walker v. Secretary of the Treasury, I.R.S., 713 F. Supp. 403, 407-08 (N.D. Ga.
1989). Summary judgment was later overruled in favor of the employer on the basis that
the employee failed to prove beyond a preponderance of the evidence that her termination
was the result of invidious discrimination on the basis of color. See Walker v. Secretary
of the Treasury, I.R.S., 742 F. Supp. 670, 676 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
139. 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
140. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 407-08.
141. Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 613 (1987) (footnote omitted).
142. "Physiognomic" is defined as "the face or countenance, especially when consid-
ered as an index to the character." The Random House College Dictionary (rev. ed.
1988). See also Recent Case, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1403, 1406-08 (1990) (suggesting that the
decision is a "double-edged sword" because it recognizes the invidious nature of in-
traracial discrimination while diluting the legislative intent of the Civil Rights Act of
1866).
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